In linguistics, linguistic competence is the system of unconscious knowledge that one knows when they know a language. It is distinguished from linguistic performance, which includes all other factors that allow one to use one's language in practice.
John Lyons Language And Linguistics An Introduction 207.pdf
A broad front of linguists have critiqued the notion of linguistic competence, often severely. Functionalists, who argue for a usage-based approach to linguistics, argue that linguistic competence is derived from and informed by language use, performance, taking the directly opposite view to the generative model.[9][10] As a result, in functionalist theories, emphasis is placed on experimental methods to understand the linguistic competence of individuals.
Aphasia refers to a family of clinically diverse disorders that affect the ability to communicate by oral or written language, or both, following brain damage.[31] In aphasia, the inherent neurological damage is frequently assumed to be a loss of implicit linguistic competence that has damaged or wiped out neural centers or pathways that are necessary for maintenance of the language rules and representations needed to communicate. The measurement of implicit language competence, although apparently necessary and satisfying for theoretic linguistics, is complexly interwoven with performance factors. Transience, stimulability, and variability in aphasia language use provide evidence for an access deficit model that supports performance loss.[32]
Obviously then, types play an important role in philosophy oflanguage, linguistics and, with its emphasis on expressions, logic.Especially noteworthy is the debate concerning the relation between themeaning of a sentence type and the speaker's meaning in using atoken (a relation that figures prominently in Grice 1969). But thetype-token distinction also functions significantly in other branchesof philosophy as well. In philosophy of mind, it yields twoversions of the identity theory of mind (each of which is criticized inKripke 1972). The type version of the identity theory (defended bySmart (1959) and Place (1956) among others) identifies typesof mental events/states/processes with types of physicalevents/states/processes. It says that just as lightning turned out tobe electrical discharge, so pain might turn out to be c-fiberstimulation, and consciousness might turn out to be brain waves of 40cycles per second. On this type view, thinking and feeling are certaintypes of neurological processes, so absent those processes, there canbe no thinking. The token identity theory (defended by Kim (1966) andDavidson (1980) among others) maintains that every token mental eventis some token physical event or other, but it denies that a typematch-up must be expected. So for example, even if pain in humans turnsout to be c-fiber stimulation, there may be other life forms that lackc-fibers but have pains too. And even if consciousness in humans turnsout to be a brain waves that occur 40 times per second, perhapsandroids have consciousness even if they lack such brain waves.
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